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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD CHARLES PITTS, JR. 
and MARILYN J. PITTS, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPEL-
LANTS 
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC. , dba 
JENSEN ASSOCIATES and dba 
DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOP-
MENT, and JOHN DOES I THROUGH 
x, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15428 
This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant 
corporations alleging damage to real property located in Sum-
mit County and requesting compensatory and punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A judgment by default was entered on August 1, 1977 by 
the Honorable David Dee in the amount of $36, 000. Defendants' 
Motion to Accept an Answer and Vacate the Default Judgment was 
denied on August 31, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek vacati.on of the judgment and a remand to 
-1-
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the District Court for a trial upon the issues. In the al-
ternative defendants seek a remand to the District Court for 
a hearing on damages only or for an order of this Court va-
cating all punitive damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 2, 1976 a complaint was filed against the four 
defendant corporations. Plaintiffs alleged that they were 
owners of a certain lot contained in Forest Meadow Ranch, swr,-
mit County, State of Utah. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
trespassed upon said property, used the property as a dump, 
destroyed valuable timber on the property, and committed waste 
and destruction. Plaintiffs asked for compensatory damages 
of $11,000 for damages to the property, $15,000 trebled dam-
ages for destroying the timber, and an additional $10 ,000 as 
general punitive damages. (R., pp. 2-3). 
A summons was issued by plaintiff's attorney on July 30, 
1976. (R., p. 4). It was not served until approximately nine 
months later on April 14, 1977. (R., p. 5). Approximately 
3-1/2 months after service plaintiffs went before the Honor-
able David Dee and requested a default judgment be entered. 
The minute entry reflects that the plaintiff was sworn and 
examined. (R., p. 7). A court reporter was not present at 
said hearing. Accordingly, a judgment by default was entered 
· · tered on Au· 
on August 1, 1977 and a default certificate was en 
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'] llS t 2 1 19 7 7 • ( R. I pp. 8 I 6) • 
one week later plaintiff moved for an Order in Supple-
mental Proceedings. (R., p. 9). On August 11, 1977 Brent 
Jensen was served with the Motion for Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings. (R. I p. 11). 
on August 30, 1977 defendants moved "To Accept Answer And 
Vacate Default Judgment". (R., pp. 12-13). An affidavit of 
Stanley Adams, defendants' attorney, accompanied the motion. 
(R., pp. 14-15). A proposed answer was also filed at that time. 
(R., pp. 16-17). 
On August 31, 1977 defendants' ·Motion to Vacate came be-
fore the Honorable David Dee and after arguments of counsel 
the motion was denied. (R., p. 20). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFEN-
DANTS. 
It is undisputed that the complaint in this action was 
filed in August of 1976. Nine months later in April of 1977 
it was served upon Brent Jensen who was an officer and direc-
tor of all of the defendant companies. Three and one-half 
months after service the default judgment was taken against 
defendants. 
During the hearing to set aside the default judgment de-
-3-
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fendants' counsel stated to the Court that Mr. Jensen 
COUld 
not specifically recall being served with the summons but tha: 
he could not deny service. The trial judge acknowledged at 
the hearing that Mr. Jensen had been before him previously i~ 
a number of separate court proceedings involving real estate. 
Defendants' counsel informed the Court that Jensen either be-
came confused from the other cases or simply forgot to notif)' 
his attorney. Defendants' attorney stated in court and in 
his affidavit that defendants had valid defenses to all of 
plaintiffs' claims and were prepared to prove their defenses 
if the judgment were vacated. The record is also clear that 
immediately upon being served with an Order In Supplemental 
Proceedings defendants filed their motion to set aside the 
judgment and filed a proposed answer to the complaint. 
It is apparent from the Record that this is not a case i: 
which a party has flagrantly violated court mandates by faili:,: 
to file answers or discovery documents. Except for the ini-
tial service of the complaint upon agent Jensen, there was ne· 
ver any contact by plaintiff's attorney nor any type of notice 
given that a default would be taken. While notice may not be 
required under the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is obvious 
that a case in which repeated demand or notice has been given 
f d faul' to a party is a much stronger case for affirmance o a e · 
judgment than one where only an initial contact of service was 
-4-
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It 
made upon an agent representing many corporations. 
There are, of course, numerous decisions by this Court 
stating that a default judgment should be vacated if there is 
any reasonable excuse so that a litigant may have his day in 
court. As stated by Justice Crockett in one such example: 
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevokably 
on a party without a hearing is obviously a 
harsh and oppressive thing. It is fundamen-
tal in our system of justice that each party 
to the controversy should be afforded an op-
portunity to present his side of the case. 
For that reason it is quite uniformly re-
garded as an abuse of discretion to refuse 
to vacate a default judgment where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear, and timely ap-
plication is made to set it aside. Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 U.2d 52, 376 
P.2d 951, 952 (1962) (Emphasis added). 
See also Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1953); Central Finance Company v. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316 (Utah 
1969); Downey State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corporation, 545 
P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
Default judgments are indeed "harsh" remedies. In this 
case, however, an additional hardship is present since $20,000 
of the $36,000 default judgment is for punitive damages. 
Plaintiff claimed damage to their property of $11, 000, and 
dw~age to their trees of $5,000 which was trebled pursuant 
~Section 78-38-3, u.C.A. The remaining $10,000 consisted 
of punitive damages awarded for alleged injury in destroying 
and wasting plaintiff's property. Thus, even assuming plain-
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tiff's prayer to be correct, the default judgment included 
compensatory damages of $16, 000 and punitive damages of s20 
" 
Such a result can only be termed as extraordinarily harsh, L: 
beyond the normal consequences of a default judgment. 
Finally, the default judgment was taken in a county ot~: 
than the correct county mandated by the Utah venue statute, 
78-13-1, U. C.A. This provision states that an action for in· 
juries to real property must be tried in the county in which 
the subject of the action is situated. Thus, the default 
judgment was entered in the wrong county causing confusion 
on the part of defendants' attorney and being in clear viola· 
tion of Utah statutory law. 
Justice requires that defendants be given an opportunity 
to defend the claims made against them. Plaintiffs have sho1i 
no substantial harm that will result by the vacating of the 
default judgment especially since defendants have offered to 
pay all costs incurred as a result of defendants' failure to 
respond to the initial complaint. For these reasons, there· 
fore, the default judgment of $36, 000 should be vacated and 
the case remanded to the District Court for venue transfer anc 
trial on the issues. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT IS NOT VACATED, THE CASE SHOULD BE 
REi"IANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR A DE-
TERMINATION OF DAMAGES. 
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Rule 55(a) (2) states that a default judgment must be 
taken by the Court in all cases where it is necessary to de-
termine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averrnent by evidence and that the court may conduct such 
hearings as necessary and proper. There is no question that 
$20,000 of the judgment consisted of punitive damages. Since 
plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered $5,000 for the loss 
of their timber the trebled award of $15,000 consisted of 
$10,000 punitive damages upon the timber issue alone. This 
Court has stated in Pehrson v. Saderup, 498 P.2d 648 (Utah 
1972) that treble damages cannot be obtained under Section 
78-38-3 U.C.A. for a mistaken cutting of timber unless there 
is evidence that the cutting was willful, wanton, or malicious. 
These are elements of punitive damages. 
Likewise, paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint specifi-
cally asks for punitive da~ages of $10,000 which must neces-
sarily partially include the cutting of the timber. 
Unlike liquidated damages plead in a complaint, unliqui-
dated damages must be specifically proved by a plaintiff if 
he is to prevail in a default judgment. In other words, the 
entry of a default precludes defendant from offering testimony 
in defense, but does not necessarily obviate the obligation of 
the plaintiff to furnish adequate proof on the issue of dam-
ages. Metric Investment Inc. v. Patterson, 236 A.2d 187 (Sup. 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ct. N.J. 1967). 
This same principle of liquidated damages especially 
applies to punitive damages since their award is not a matt'· 
of right but depends upon that degree of proof showing wan-
ton and willful conduct of a defendant. The quantum of Puni. 
tive damages must be established by sufficient proof. Flaks 
-
v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. 1974). This Court has alsr 
recognized the necessity of proof before punitive damages ca:. 
be awarded in a default judgment. Security Adjustment Bureai; 
v. West, 437 P.2d 214 (Utah 1968). 
In reviewing whether or not sufficient proof has been 
offered to a trial court during a default proceeding the norr 
rules of evidence are applicable. Where proof of the cause c' 
action or of the amount of a plaintiff's claim or demand is 
necessary, the general rules of evidence apply in a proceedir.: 
for a default judgment with regard to the admissibility and 
the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Plaintiff's proc: 
must conform to his allegations, and must be sufficient to ma• 
out his case with legal certainty. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Sec· 
tion 213(b), pp. 375-376, 
Thus, in order to show sufficient evidence for an award 
of punitive damages there must appear, not only that there wa: 
a wrongful invasion of plaintiffs' rights, but that it was 
done willfully and maliciously. It must appear that mere re-
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colltpense for actual loss is inadequate and that the plain-
tiffs should have added compensation. The punitive damages 
should not be unreasonably disproportionate to the actual 
damages suffered or to the nature of the wrong done and the 
injury caused. Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); 
Palombi v. D. & c. Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969). 
In this instance there is no justification for an award 
of punitive damages. Even the plaintiffs' complaint fails 
to contain the necessary allegations for punitive damages to 
be awarded. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint ask for tre-
ble damages from destruction of the trees but do not allege 
malicious or wanton conduct on the part of defendants. Para-
graph 6 of the complaint while alleging "intentional" and 
"willful" conduct does not allege "malice" or "wantonness"--
necessary elements of a punitive damage allegation. 25 C.J.S., 
Damages, Section 123{b), p. 721. 
The record itself contains no evidence of any malicious 
conduct of defendants. There is no record of the testimony of 
plaintiff at the default hearing so it is impossible to know 
what was stated before the trial court. There are no findings, 
minute entries, exhibits, or affidavits by which this Court 
can review the award of punitive damages. 
The Colorado court of Appeals in Norton v. Raymond, 491 
P.2d 1403 (Ct. App. Colo. 1971) addressed this problem. The 
-9-
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Court stated: 
It is the duty of the trial court to make 
sufficient findings to enable the appellate 
court to clearly understand the basis of 
the trial court's decision and to enable 
it to determine the grounds on which it 
rendered its decision. The trial court 
made no findings in this case as to juris-
diction, nature of the plaintiff's action, 
basis of the court's decision, amount of 
principal involved as distinguished from 
interest in the final judgment, nor was 
there evidence before the court at the time 
the judgment was entered to give the basis 
of any appropriate findings. 
* * * 
It is clear from the absence of evi-
dence in the record that it is impossible 
to determine if substantial justice has 
been done. Therefore, in the interest of 
substantial justice, the plaintiff should 
be required to prove his claim and the de-
fendant should be given an opportunity to 
present his defense. Id. at 1404-1405. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals also addressed this ques· 
tion of reviewing a default judgment containing punitive d~· 
ages. In that case a record of the proceedings had been made 
to enable the appellate court to review the proof offered to 
the trial court. That court stated: 
A review of the evidence leads us to the 
conclusion that it is wholly insufficient 
to sustain the judgment on that count. 
Said count deals with alleged fraud and 
misrepresentations by defendants with re-
spect to the condition of the stairway of 
the apartment building. The burden was 
on plaintiff to adduce some substantial 
evidence to sustain said allegations to 
entitle him to actual damages, to say 
nothing about punitive damages. 
-10-
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* * * 
As sometL~es happens in trials by 
default, the evidence as to the second 
count appears to have been presented hur-
riedly and without proper regard for its 
probative value to prove the issues be-
ing tried. The practice should be exactly 
the opposite. Where a party seeks a judg-
ment against another who is in default 
and not represented by counsel, he should 
proceed with even more care than usual to 
see that all requirements of the law are 
met. This for the very reason that the 
other side is not represented. Riley v. 
White, 231 S.W.2d 291, 297-298 (Ct. App. 
Mo. 1950). (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case there is no record or evidence in 
the file showing a justification for the award of the unli-
quidated punitive damages. The judgment on its face shows 
that punitive damages were clearly excessive since they to-
taled $20,000 as opposed to $16,000 of compensatory damages 
(even assuming such damages did in fact occur) • As such 
this Court, as a matter of law, should modify or vacate the 
punitive damage award. Kesler v. Rogers 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1975); Palombi v. o. & c. Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969). 
The Arizona Appellate Court in reviewing a default judg-
ment for $50,000 concluded that there was no sufficient evi-
dence in the record to justify such an award and remanded 
the case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing 
upon the issue of damages alone. The court stated: 
We hold that when proof of damages after 
a default in an unliquidated damage case 
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is as scanty as that presented to the court 
here, an order setting aside a default judg-
ment, but not the default itself, is justi-
fied, Camacho v. Gardner, 435 P.2d 719 
(Ariz. App. 1967). 
Defendants respectfully request, therefore, that if ~G 
Court fails to grant the relief asked for in Point r of this 
brief, i.e. , vacation of the judgment and remand to the lower 
court for trial of all issues, that a second or third remedy 
be afforded defendants--reduction of the judgment as a matter 
of law by this Court or remand to the trial court for a hear-
ing of record limited solely to the question of damages, 
CONCLUSION 
A motion to set aside a default judgment necessarily in· 
valves a weighing of substantial interests. On the one hand, 
it is in the interest of society to effectively provide a sys· 
tern for redress of grievances and to discourage unnecessary 
delay and breakdown of the system. On the other hand, it is 
desirable to provide all litigants a fair opportunity to pre· 
sent their case and to receive a trial on the issues. 
In the instant case there is no doubt that defendants' 
agent neglected his duty to respond to the allegations of 
plaintiffs' complaint within the time allowed by law. Such 
failure was clearly a mistake on the part of Mr. Jensen. How-
ever, the record shows that this is not an instance where a 
party has willfully refused to obey the court process or has 
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i~tentionally disregarded repeated demands to respond to 
plaintiffs' pleadings. Rather, it shows a pure and simple 
case of excusable neglect and inadvertence on the part of 
defendants. 
In weighing the interests of the parties it should be 
apparent that defendants' two-month tardy response does not 
justify imposition of a judgment totaling $36,000--$20,000 
of which is for punitive damages. The normally harsh remedy 
of default becomes unconscionably harsh with the addition of 
the punitive damage award. 
For this reason the previous decisions of this Court 
and the dictates of substantial justice require that the judg-
ment be vacated, that defendants be ordered to pay any dam-
ages incurred by plaintiffs for such delay, and that the case 
be remanded to the trial court for adjudication of the issues. 
In the alternative, although much less satisfactory in 
view of the facts of this case, defendants request that the 
case be remanded for a trial on the issue of damages alone or 
that the judgment be reduced by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
r / I \,_ ', / ,· ' / 
,,~ 1/::, /// ~' A 
. \ -,~2./J_,.;, '-"c~((A:Ltt-;_.L--' 
STANLEY S. ADAMS 
Arrow Press Square 
Glass Factory, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 533-8073 
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CRAIG STEPHENS COOK 
Of Counsel 
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